

2024 Active-Passive Investor Summit

October 2024

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Starboard Has Three Ideas To Discuss Today






Two Years Ago, We Discussed the Value Creation Opportunity at Salesforce





At the Time, We Highlighted Salesforce Lagged Its Peers on the Combination of Growth and Profitability




Source: Starboard presentation.

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Since Then, Salesforce Has Undergone a Remarkable Transformation to Increase Its Operating Margins

Over the last few years, Salesforce has significantly expanded operating margins, increasing profitability by more than 1,000bps since FY2023.



Source: Company filings, Capital IQ.

Note: Fiscal Year ends January 31. Prior consensus estimates reflect consensus estimates as of October 17, 2022.

(1) Represents restated FY2017 results reflecting change to accounting standards under ASC 606. (2) Excludes \$166 million loss on settlement of Salesforce.org reseller agreement. (3) Represents increases vs. 22.5% (FY2023 Historical).



Salesforce Has Made Progress Improving Growth and Profitability

We believe Salesforce can be best-in-class among its Peer Group and operate at or above the Rule of 50.



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
(1) MSFT figures reflect estimates for the Productivity and Business Processes segment. (2) Reflects CY2022E CRM estimates from the 2022 Active-Passive Conference.

Starboard has identified ADBE, INTU, MSFT, NOW, ORCL, SAP, and WDAY as the relevant peer set for comparison with CRM. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparison. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of

subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other companies had been included.

Investors Have Rewarded Salesforce for Improving Its Combination of Growth and Profitability

Over the last two years, Salesforce's stock price has nearly doubled as investors have appreciated the Company's focus on improving profitability and more shareholder-friendly capital allocation.




Salesforce has created significant shareholder value over the last two years.

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We Believe Salesforce's Current Valuation Is Compelling

Salesforce is currently trading at a significant discount to the peer group.



We believe Salesforce's current valuation is compelling.


Source: Capital IQ, Visible Alpha. Market data as of October 18, 2024.

Starboard has identified ADBE, INTU, MSFT, NOW, ORCL, SAP, and WDAY as the relevant peer set for comparison with CRM. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other companies had been included.




We Believe Salesforce's Newest Offering, Agentforce, Has the Potential to Drive Improved Revenue Growth...





...And Salesforce Can Continue to Become More Efficient and More Profitable

Salesforce has driven meaningful improvements in sales and marketing and G&A efficiency since FY2023, and we believe it can continue to drive incremental efficiencies in these categories.




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Source: Company filings, Visible Alpha. (1) Reflects consensus estimates. (2) The Peer Group includes ADBE, INTU, MSFT, NOW, ORCL, SAP, and WDAY and reflects median consensus estimates for the Peer Group in CY2024E. Starboard has identified ADBE, INTU, MSFT, NOW, ORCL, SAP, and WDAY as the relevant peer set for comparison with CRM. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparison. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other companies had been included.

Salesforce Has Multiple Paths to Reaching the Rule of 50 by FY2028

We believe Salesforce can operate above the Rule of 50 by improving revenue growth and continuing to expand margins.



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Salesforce Can Achieve the Rule of 50 by FY2028

We believe Salesforce can operate above the Rule of 50 by improving revenue growth and continuing to expand margins.



Source: Company filings, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Visible Alpha. Note: Rule of 50 score reflects CY2025E revenue growth + CY2025E adjusted operating margin.


(1) MSFT figures reflect estimates for the Productivity and Business Processes segment.

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Salesforce's Current Valuation Is Compelling, Especially If the Company Can Reach, and Exceed, the <u>Rule of 50</u>

If Salesforce can achieve a financial profile that is at least in-line with peer levels, its stock is currently trading at ~14x FY2028 free cash flow.



We believe Salesforce can reach the <u>Rule of 50</u> and generate more than \$20 of free cash flow per share in FY2028.

Source: Capital IQ, Visible Alpha. Market data as of October 18, 2024.

Starboard has identified ADBE, INTU, MSFT, NOW, ORCL, SAP, and WDAY as the relevant peer set for comparison with CRM. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other companies had been included.



Starboard Has Three Ideas To Discuss Today





If You Have a Headache, You're Likely to Take Tylenol



Tylenol is the leading over-the-counter pain relief medication.



If You Have Allergies, You're Likely to Take Zyrtec...



Zyrtec is one of the leading over-the-counter antihistamines.



... Or You Might Take Benadryl



Benadryl is one of the leading over-the-counter antihistamines.



If You Have a Minor Cut, You Ask For a BAND-AID...



BAND-AIDs are the leading wound-care treatment.



... And You're Also Likely to Use Neosporin



Neosporin is the leading first aid antibiotic.



When You Think of Mouthwash, You Think of Listerine



Listerine is the dominant mouthwash brand.





Neutrogena and Aveeno are Household Skin Care Brands



Neutrogena and Aveeno are leading skin care brands.



Collectively, These Are Among the Most Well-Known and Widely-Used Consumer Health Brands...






... But What You Might Not Know is <u>All of These</u> <u>Brands Are Owned By the Same Company</u>







Kenvue Was Recently Created Through the Spin of Johnson and Johnson's Consumer Health Business




Kenvue was created in May 2023 as the spin of J&J's Consumer Health business.



Source: Public company filings.

We Believe the Separation Had Substantial Merit As Consumer Health Is a Fundamentally Different Business From J&J's Core

Kenvue's underlying business drivers – principally consumer marketing – are fundamentally different than J&J's core business.



Importance of Consumer Marketing and Speed of Innovation

We believe that Kenvue should perform well as an independent company.

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J&J Management Astutely Recognized the Differences Between Consumer Health and Its Core Businesses, Leading to Its Separation

J&J Management Commentary




Alex Gorsky J&J Chairman and CEO November 2021 "Now in this particular case, we've seen a significant evolution in these markets, particularly on the consumer side, whether it's the innovation being sought by consumers, whether it's the evolving nature of the channels, the distribution, the shift to e-commerce. And as we observe that, and I must say, I think it was accelerated quite significantly with COVID-19, where we're seeing greater interest in personal care and taking care of the families. We felt that this, in fact, was the right time to recognize the differences between the consumer-facing business versus that in our medical device and pharmaceuticals.

What I would reflect on is that we think these have evolved as fundamentally different businesses. If you look at, for example, the rate and pace of innovation, the level of science and technology involved in pharmaceutical and medical devices. If you look at the investment required for clinical development plans, if you look at the regulatory pathways, if you take a look at the distribution channels where you shift through intermediaries versus a more business to consumer interface that we're seeing on consumer as well as the actual sales and marketing and contracting and working to ensure access around the world. These 2 businesses share many more common themes versus our consumer business. And we think that it makes strategic sense for these 2 businesses to continue to work together."

J&J management recognized the differences between Consumer Health and its core businesses, leading to the separation.



In Summary, We Believe the Consumer Health Separation Had Tremendous Merit and Liberated a Great Business with Amazing Brands





Consumer Health Made Up a Smaller and Smaller Mix of J&J's Overall Business Over Time



Consumer Health was the smallest segment within J&J.



Understanding Kenvue's Brand Portfolio as a Standalone Company



Kenvue Operates Three Segments With an Impressive Portfolio of Brands That Is Impossible to Replicate





We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to Colgate-Palmolive



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus Colgate-Palmolive.



We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to Haleon



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus Haleon.



We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to P&G



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus P&G.



We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to Church & Dwight



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus Church & Dwight.



We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to Clorox



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus Clorox.



We Believe Kenvue's Brands Compare Favorably to Kimberly Clark



We believe Kenvue has a better personal care brand portfolio versus Kimberly Clark.



We Believe Kenvue Has the Best Brand Portfolio In Its Peer Group


Kenvue					
Tylenol	LISTERINE	(Benadryl)	ZYRTEC	SUDAFED®	Motrin
BAND -AID	Neutrogena	Aveeno.	Johnsonis baby	Rogaine	Ogr
P&G	Colgate-Palmolive		Haleon		
OlayGilletteTAMPAXOlayImage: Constant of the second s	Coral B Performance Spice		NOLIVE Sanex	Advil THERAFU SENSODYNE	
Clorox		Church & Dwight		Kimberly Clark	
CLOROX: GLA PILO-SO: OBRI BURT'S BEES Hidden t	TA	Craj	el heraBreath		Wites Cleenex. +ex Scott

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Source: Public company filings.

Kenvue's Categories Are Also More Defensible Than Peers With Less Threat From Private Label Alternatives




Kenvue is better suited to handle private label threat than its average peer.

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Source: Wall Street research.

Lastly, Kenvue's Categories Are Also Supported By Attractive End Markets



Kenvue's end-markets are expected to grow LSD to MSD through 2030.

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Source: Public company filings and Wall Street Research.

(1) Represents expected annualized growth 2021 - 2030. (2) Average of smoking cessation and digestive remedies. (3) Average of facial and body care. (4) Average of adult sun care and hair care.


(5) Represents wound care expected growth rate.

Given Its Strong Brands in Attractive Categories, <u>Where Would You Expect Kenvue Is Valued</u> <u>Relative To Its Peers?</u>



Kenvue Trades at a Valuation Discount to Peers

P / CY25 Earnings



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Source: CapIQ and Bloomberg. As of October 18, 2024.

Kenvue's Share Price Performance Since Its Spin Has Been Frustrating



Source: Bloomberg. (1) Represents TSR from May 4, 2023 to October 18, 2024. Excludes the gain realized from the IPO price to the close on the first trading day.




Kenvue Has Great Brands and Its Separation From J&J Made Perfect Sense, <u>But Its Share Price Has</u> <u>Underperformed Since Its IPO... Why?</u>



Prior to the Spin, Kenvue Grew Slower Than Its Underlying Markets...

Net Sales Growth CAGR % (2019-22)




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Source: Public company filings.

... And Following the Spin, 2023 Growth Missed Expectations... Even After Lowering Guidance




After the separation, Kenvue missed its organic growth expectations for 2023.

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Source: Public company filings. (1) Represents the mid-point of guidance.

Looking Forward, Kenvue's Organic Growth Is Expected to Continue Lagging Its Peer Group




Kenvue's organic growth over the next three years is expected to lag its peers.

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Source: Bloomberg and CapIQ. Estimates as of October 18, 2024.

Still, Even Accounting for Kenvue's Lower Growth Outlook, the Company's Valuation Discount Appears Excessive...




Kenvue trades at a steep discount to its peers – even accounting for its growth profile.

Source: Capital IQ., and Wall Street Research. Market data as of October, 18, 2024.



... Which We Believe Presents an Opportunity as the Company's Renewed Focus Should Result In More Consistency and Credibility...




We believe improving consistency and credibility should provide meaningful upside.

Source: Capital IQ., and Wall Street Research. Market data as of October, 18, 2024.



... With Even Greater Upside Potential as Increased Focus Translates Into Better Execution



Further, we believe heightened focused should drive improved execution and higher growth.

Source: Capital IQ., and Wall Street Research. Market data as of October, 18, 2024.



Although Kenvue's <u>Consolidated</u> Growth Has Fallen Short, <u>Individual Segment Performance Has</u> <u>Varied</u>



Kenvue's Self Care Segment Has Performed Extremely Well

"Self Care delivered another banner year of 8.4% organic growth, sustaining the momentum we have built over the past several years, resulting, once again, in strong revenue growth and share gain."

> Thibaut Mongon (Kenvue CEO) February 2024





The Essential Health Segment Also Performed Well in 2023

"Essential Health grew ahead of our long-term expectations with 3.6% organic growth, while continuing to execute our strategy to drive gross margin enhancement through successful value realization and premiumization initiatives."

Thibaut Mongon (Kenvue CEO) February 2024





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The Problem / Opportunity Lies in Skin Health and Beauty


"And in Skin Health and Beauty, organic growth was 1.8% <u>less than we expected</u>, <u>mostly due to</u> <u>specific missteps around in-store execution in the U.S</u>... However, it is our performance in the U.S. that did not meet our expectations... <u>frankly, the execution of this plan was disappointing.</u>"

> Thibaut Mongon (Kenvue CEO) February 2024





Importantly, Skin Health and Beauty Growth Has Weighed on Kenvue's Consolidated Organic Growth




Consolidated Kenvue

Consolidated Excl. Skin Health and Beauty



Source: Public company filings and Wall Street research.

Notably, Skin Health and Beauty's Lackluster Growth Is a Kenvue Specific Issue as Its Peers Have Grown Nicely




Industry growth is not the issue with Skin Health and Beauty.

Source: Public company filings and Wall Street research. (1) Represents market growth rates for Face / Body Care and Hair, Sun, and Other categories, weighted based upon Kenvue's sales mix. Starboard has identified OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



Skin Health and Beauty's Margins Have Also Declined



Skin Health and Beauty's margins have meaningfully declined over time.


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Source: Public company filings. (1) Note reported adjusted segment margins do not include an estimated allocation of corporate overhead.

Skin Health and Beauty's Margins Now Trail Peers





Skin Health and Beauty now has below peer profitability.

Source: Public company presentations and filings. (1) Includes an estimate for allocated corporate overhead.



Given Kenvue's Strong Underlying Fundamentals, <u>Why Has the Company – and Skin Health and</u> <u>Beauty in Particular – Underperformed?</u>



We Believe Skin Health & Beauty's Issues Trace Back to Its Prior Ownership and Will Now be Addressed That Kenvue Is an Independent Company

We believe Consumer Health – especially SH&B – was not prioritized under J&J

We believe Consumer Health previously did not have a marketing and innovation culture

Poor marketing and innovation have resulted in Consumer Health's financial underperformance




Skin Health and Beauty Is a Fundamentally Different Business Than J&J's Core Pharma Business



This change has taken time.



At Its Core, Pharma Businesses Depend On Long-Cycle, Rigorous, and Extremely Expensive R&D...



Large capital investments, long-product cycles, complex trials, and high regulatory burden require significant internal R&D scrutiny and bureaucracy

... Unlike Skin Health and Beauty Which Depends More On Marketing and Faster Product Cycles

The skin care and hair care industries – like other consumer goods – rely on marketing to drive sales






As an independent company, we believe Kenvue has the potential to significantly improve the struggling Skin Health and Beauty Segment – <u>but it</u> <u>must embrace a new marketing driven culture</u>.



Neutrogena and Aveeno Remain Highly Regarded Brands



We believe reinvigorating skin health and beauty will be aided by its enduring customer equity.

Source: Wall Street research.



Skin Health and Beauty Is a Priority for Management

Kenvue Management Commentary





"Regarding your question on the Skin Health segment and how -- what we should expect moving forward in Skin Health. Our diagnostic has not changed. I've always said that our recovery would not happen overnight, will not be linear. <u>We have developed a thoughtful plan. It's a priority for us</u>. Jan and his team in the U.S. are laser-focused on executing this plan, the objective to stabilize brand in 2024 with improving volumes as the year goes on and deliver growth from 2025 onwards."

Thibaut Mongon (Kenvue CEO) May 2024

"Sure. yes. Look, I mean, <u>North America in Skin Health and Beauty is a huge priority for the business and for</u> <u>Kenvue.</u> It's such an exciting dynamic segment. So we are really focused on 3 things in our segment in North America. The first is about reaching more consumers and more health care professionals. The second is about really brilliantly activating an -- activating in-store, so really driving our presence and our prominence, both in-store and online. And thirdly, it's about amplifying our innovation."

> Charmaine England (Kenvue Chief Growth Officer) September 2024

Management is focused on improving Skin Health and Beauty performance.



Kenvue's Improved Focus and Resource Allocation Is Evidenced By Its Increasing Advertising Spend


"We started the year with a 15% year-over-year increase. <u>Remember, it was \$300 million that we talked about</u>. As we have seen the acceleration of initiatives take hold and we have seen the benefits of gross margin enhancement, now we feel more confident in investing 20% more instead of 15% more. <u>So we</u> added another \$100 million that we are starting to deploy as of Q2 and going forward."

Paul Ruh, Kenvue CFO

August 2024

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Critically, the Company Appears to Have Embraced a Marketing-First Mentality for Its Skin Health and Beauty Focused on Social Media


Demi Lovato / OGX Partnership

Demi Lovato on Middle Parts, *Child Star*, and Creating the Song of the Summer with OGX


"OG me, OG you, OG we, OG new."

BY CAROL LEE PUBLISHED: JUL 18, 2024 9:00 AM EDT

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TikTok / Instagram Partnerships



Collagen Bank TikTok Launch





Neutrogena's Recent Collagen Bank Launch Highlights Marketing First Mentality As Well As On-Trend Product Innovation



- Product launched on TikTok prior to in-store distribution
- Partnered with Hailee Steinfeld (20mm Instagram followers / 4mm
 TikTok followers) to be the face of the product

Various partnerships with Instagram and TikTok influencers to promote the product

Introduced new product during the early-innings of new trend



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Neutrogena's recent Collagen Bank product launch is very encouraging.

CeraVe Case Study Highlights the Importance of Social Media Marketing For Skin Health and Beauty Success

L'Oréal Acquired CeraVe in 2017...




- f PARIS L'Oréal is bolstering its U.S. business in the dynamic active cosmetics segment.
- X
- The world's largest beauty company said on Tuesday that it has signed a definitive agreement with Valeant Pharmaceuticals
- International Inc. to acquire the CeraVe, AcneFree and Ambi skin care brands for \$1.3 billion in cash.



CeraVe Case Study Highlights the Importance of Social Media Marketing For Skin Health and Beauty Success (Cont'd)

L'Oréal Acquires CeraVe in 2017...








CeraVe Case Study Highlights the Importance of Social Media Marketing For Skin Health and Beauty Success (Cont'd)

L'Oréal Acquires CeraVe in 2017...







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Summary



We Believe Kenvue Has the Best Brand Portfolio In Its Peer Group

		Kenvue			
Tylenol	LISTERINE	(Benadryl)	ZYRTEC	SUDAFED®	Motrin
BAND -AID	Neutrogena	Aveeno.	Johnsonis baby	Rogaine	Ogr
P&G		Colgate-Palmolive		Hale	eon
OlayGilletteTAMPAXOlayImage: Constant of the second s	Coral B Performance Spice		NOLIVE Sanex	Advil THERAFU SENSODYNE	
Clorox		Church & Dwight		Kimberl	y Clark
CLOROX: GLA PILL2-SU: OBRI BURT'S BEES Hidden t	TA	Craj	el heraBreath		Wites Cleenex. +ex Scott


STARBOARD VALUE

74

Source: Public company filings.

Starboard has identified PG, CL, HLN, CLX, CHD, and KMB as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.

We Believe Kenvue Is Too Cheap Given Its World-Class Brand Portfolio and Current Consensus Growth Expectations



Kenvue trades at a steep discount to its peers – even accounting for its growth profile.

Source: Capital IQ., and Wall Street Research. Market data as of October, 18, 2024.

Starboard has identified PG, CL, HLN, CLX, CHD, KMB, OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



We Believe Kenvue Can Improve Performance – Specifically Within Its Skin Health and Beauty Business


	Kenvue Performance by Segment	
	Management Commentary	Performance
Self Care	"Self Care delivered another banner year of 8.4% organic growth, sustaining the momentum we have built over the past several years, resulting, once again, in strong revenue growth and share gain."	\checkmark
	Thibaut Mongon (CEO)	
Essential Health	"Essential Health grew ahead of our long-term expectations with 3.6% organic growth, while continuing to execute our strategy to drive gross margin enhancement through successful value realization and premiumization initiatives."	\checkmark
IIcaltii	Thibaut Mongon (CEO)	
	"And in Skin Health and Beauty, <u>organic growth was 1.8% less than we expected, mostly due to specific missteps around</u> <u>in-store execution in the U.S However, it is our performance in the U.S. that did not meet our expectations</u> . As we	
Skin Health and Beauty	have talked with you about, we had ambitious fourth quarter recovery plan for the U.S., but frankly, <u>the execution of this plan</u> was disappointing. Restoring Neutrogena to the level of growth, we know the brand is capable of is a priority for me and for the team."	X
	Thibaut Mongon (CEO)	

While portions of Kenvue's business are performing well, we believe Skin Health and Beauty can improve performance.

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76

We Believe a Revitalized Skin Health and Beauty Can Improve Its Organic Growth Rate to <u>At Least</u> Industry Growth Rates...




Industry growth is not the issue with Skin Health and Beauty.

Source: Public company filings and Wall Street research. (1) Represents market growth rates for Face / Body Care and Hair, Sun, and Other categories, weighted based upon Kenvue's sales mix. Starboard has identified OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



... Resulting In Improved Consolidated Growth




Source: Public company filings, Bloomberg, Wall Street research, and Starboard estimates.

Starboard has identified PG, CL, HLN, CLX, CHD, KMB, OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



We Believe Consistent Execution Along With Improved Growth Is Likely to Result In an Improved Multiple In-Line With Peers




Further, we believe heightened focused should drive improved execution and higher growth.

Source: Capital IQ., and Wall Street Research. Market data as of October, 18, 2024.

Starboard has identified PG, CL, HLN, CLX, CHD, KMB, OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



In Addition, Skin Health and Beauty Should Also Be Able to Return to FY2019 Margins, Which Would Be In-Line with Peers




We believe Skin Health and Beauty can improve its profitability.

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80

Restoring Skin Health and Beauty's Margins Would Also Improve Consolidated Margins to Best-In-Class




Source: CapIQ and Bloomberg.

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Collectively, We Believe Kenvue's Current Valuation Presents a Compelling Investment Opportunity with Asymmetric Upside Potential



82

Starboard has identified PG, CL, HLN, CLX, CHD, KMB, OR, BEI, and EL as the relevant peer set for comparison with KVUE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.

Starboard Has Three Ideas To Discuss Today





Pfizer's Mission Is to Provide Breakthroughs That Change Patients' Lives



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Source: Public company filings and website. (1) Represents 2023 sales.

Under Dr. Bourla's Leadership, Pfizer Produced Two Critical COVID-19 Breakthroughs

The Company was the first to introduce a publicly available COVID-19 vaccine and oral antiviral treatment – both of which helped end the COVID-19 pandemic.

Pfizer, in partnership with BioNTech, developed the first commercially available COVID-19 vaccine

First Covid-19 Vaccine Given to U.S. Public

A nurse in New York was among the first to receive the shot Monday morning

By Peter Loftus Follow and Melanie Grayce West Follow Updated Dec. 14, 2020 11:17 pm ET

The first U.S. Covid-19 vaccinations outside of clinical trials began Monday, kicking off <u>the most urgent mass immunization campaign</u> since polio shots were rolled out in the 1950s.

<u>A nurse in New York</u> was among the first to receive the shot, and health workers throughout the U.S. were also set to receive the newly authorized vaccine developed by <u>Pfizer</u> Inc. and <u>BioNTech</u> SE. Pfizer <u>shipped vaccine vials out</u> <u>Sunday</u>, and hospitals and health departments across the country received them early Monday. Pfizer also developed Paxlovid, a leading antiviral therapy used to treat COVID-19

Pfizer's Covid-19 Pill Is Authorized in U.S.

It is the first approval of a drug that newly infected people can easily take at home to stay out of the hospital

By Jared S. Hopkins Follow and Joseph Walker Follow Updated Dec. 22, 2021 4:32 pm ET


U.S. health regulators cleared use of a Covid-19 pill from <u>Pfizer</u> Inc., <u>the first drug</u> that newly infected patients can now take at home to stay out of the hospital.

The authorization by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on Wednesday permits doctors to prescribe the medicine to high-risk patients age 12 and older early in the course of disease, shortly after they develop symptoms.

The Company was first to market with a COVID-19 vaccine and oral antiviral treatment.



We Applaud the Company and Dr. Bourla For Their Significant Contributions to Ending the COVID-19 Pandemic




We believe the Company's COVID breakthroughs were monumental to ending the global pandemic.

STARBOARD VALUE[®]

By Itself, the Company's COVID Breakthroughs Should Have Created Substantial Value

The Company's large COVID-19 related profits ultimately resulted in significant free cash flow generation.



The Company generated ~\$40 billion in cumulative incremental free cash flow in 2021 and 2022.

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87

Source: Public company filings and Bloomberg.

(1) Incremental cash flow calculated as annual free cash flow in 2021 and 2022 in excess of the free cash flow for 2020.

(2) Excludes cash flow from discontinued operations.


However, Pfizer Has Dramatically Underperformed Peers and the Market Since 2019



Pfizer has underperformed over the last five years.

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The Company Has Lost Approximately \$20 to \$60 Billion in Market Value Since 2019




The Company has lost approximately \$20 to \$60 billion of value since 2019.

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89

We Are Excited to be a Large Pfizer Shareholder Given Its Compelling Valuation and Opportunity to Improve Performance

We believe concerns regarding the Company's innovation track record, pipeline, capital allocation, and lost credibility have resulted in a depressed valuation multiple.




We believe there is substantial upside potential at Pfizer

We are excited to own the business at its current valuation multiple as we believe there is substantial upside.

Source: Bloomberg and CapIQ.

Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.

We Believe the Company's Market Value Decline Is Attributable to a Series of Issues



Lower valuation multiple and levered balance sheet hamper future M&A, further limiting future growth


The Company has lost approximately \$20 to \$60 billion in market value since 2019



A. Lack of Internal Innovation From 2019 to 2023

At the Beginning of 2019, Pfizer Had a Robust New Product Pipeline

At the beginning of 2019, Pfizer had the fourth-most-number of new drugs in development out of its peer group.



In 2019, the Company had a diversified pipeline of potential new drug candidates.

Source: Wall Street Research.

Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



In 2019, Wall Street Analysts Were Optimistic About Pfizer's Pipeline and Future Prospects

Select Quotes from Wall Street Research Analysts

"PFE best positioned for top-line growth among large cap pharma with the pipeline capable of replenishing 41% of the FY17 revenue base by FY25 (vs. peers 7%), well in excess of the 16% of sales exposed to generic/biosimilar headwinds (vs. peers 42%). While near-term growth will be depressed by the loss of Lyrica, we believe investors will look through this to a period of renewed growth. Post-Lyrica LOE, we model revenue CAGR rising to 7.7% (FY20-25) from 2.7% (FY17-20)."

Atlantic Equities November 27, 2018

"Perhaps the greatest legacy of outgoing CEO Ian Read is a reinvigorated R&D pipeline that should sustain top-line growth beyond key patent expirations. We expect new CEO Bourla to leverage this significant boost in late-stage R&D assets to a level that could preclude the need for M&A or financial engineering"

Oppenheimer December 11, 2018

"<u>Pfizer has had pipeline success in 2018</u> with surprisingly good data from Tafamidis, Tanezumab meeting efficacy endpoints in smaller duration phase-3 trials but with questions on safety remaining, early encouraging data from next-gen JAK's for Inflammation and advancement of 20-valent pneumococcal vaccine into phase-3. <u>We believe these events have a</u> played a key role in changing the narrative on Pfizer from an M&A/Split story to a pipeline/growth story."

UBS January 22, 2019

Wall Street analysts believed the Company was well-positioned.



Management Also Frequently Told Investors Pfizer Had the "Best Pipeline" Ever

Dr. Bourla Quotes on Pfizer's Pipeline Pre-COVID

"Today, we believe that we have the best pipeline in our history. To ensure we capitalize this incredible opportunity, we must remain highly focused on successful execution. In this context, I would reiterate that we continue not to see the need for any large-scale M&A activity at this time." October 30, 2018 "Now we are facing a very different situation. Right now, we are facing our last LOE. That will be Lyrica. That will happen in June of this year. And then we have a virtually LOE-free period until the end of 2025, so for a very long period of time. At the same time, we have likely the best pipeline we've ever had at the corporation." January 3, 2019 "We view this as a significant opportunity because 3 very positive trends are intersecting at the same time: first, macro trends such as an aging population and a rising middle class in emerging markets increasing the number of people seeking access to both innovative and established medicines; second, the continued advancement of what we believe is the best pipeline in our history with good breadth and strong innovation." January 29, 2019 "But in this new scale, we retain all the growth drivers, all the products that are driving the growth and to retain the entire pipeline. As a result, this company will be, from day 1 after the separation, a best-in-class revenue growth, long term, sustainable story with a relatively unlevered balance sheet at this company and the best pipeline we ever had. So we can do miracles with this company." January 14, 2020 "And if you take a big picture view, over the last decade, we have changed and refocused our approach to R&D. We have improved dramatically its productivity, and we have developed the best pipeline we ever had and one of the best, I believe, in the industry." January 28, 2020

Management repeatedly told investors Pfizer had the best pipeline in its history.

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In Fact, In 2019, Management Committed to Delivering Innovation – Specifically On 15 Potential Blockbusters

Excerpt From 2019 Goldman Sachs Conference (January 3, 2019)



"But as you think about what markers you want to set for the company in the near term, so maybe in 12 months' time, kind of on a 3-year view or a 5-year view, how do you deem success over the short term?:"

"I think -- well, it's inevitable that for every CEO, the success is measured through -- with total shareholder return, how much your stock was appreciated and how much dividend were you able to pass to the shareholders. But let's not forget that this is only a surrogate point, a very good one because the market really knows how to value your operational value creation. But it is a surrogate point, where fundamental it is how much you can stay true to your purpose. And the purpose of the pharma company is to bring breakthrough products that change patients' lives. So the operational measurement of success will be our ability to have a constant flow of breakthrough innovation that significantly changes the current standards of care, and that's for the long term. So a way to measure it, for us, it is we have put out there a list of 15 potential blockbusters that could come by the year -- in 5 years, so it is by 2022 when we put it out in '18. And I think my focus would be to make sure that we deliver more than our fair risk adjustment of this number, and that will be success."



Albert Bourla *Pfizer Chair and CEO*


STARBOARDV

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Pfizer management committed to "constant flow" of innovation – as highlighted by 15 potential blockbusters.

Source: Public company transcripts. Quotes are bolded and underlined for emphasis.

Pfizer's Targeted 15 Blockbusters Were Initially Introduced In January 2018



Pfizer initially identified 15 potential blockbuster drugs.



At the Beginning of 2019, Management Recommitted to These 15 Pipeline Targets...

6 * JAK1 (Atopic Dermatitis) Phase 3 monotherapy readouts 1H 2019 7 * JAK3 (Alopecia Areata / Vitiligo) Phase 3 pivotal readout for alopecia areata 2H 2021 8 ✓ Xeljanz Lifecycle Mgt (PsA, UC, AS) Phase 3 pivotal readout for ankylosing spondylitis 2H 2020 9 * Clostridium Difficile Phase 3 pivotal readout 2H 2020 10 X Staphyloccoccus Aureus Discontinued (futility) N/A Vaccines 11 * 20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S. 2019; 2H 202 11 * 20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S. 2019; 2H 202 13 * Rivipansel (VOC of SCD) Phase 3 pivotal readout 2H 2019 14 ** Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy) PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation) 2H 2019 15 * Tanezumab (OA & CLBP) Reviewing data and evaluating next steps ongoing Potential Upsides Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy) Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019		al Blo		Up to 15 in 5' Prog sters Approved by 2022 (Subje		
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Image: Sease & Internal Medicine 13 * Rivipansel (VOC of SCD) Phase 3 pivotal readout 2H 2019 Internal Medicine 14 * Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy) PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation) 2H 2019 15 * Tanezumab (OA & CLBP) Reviewing data and evaluating next steps ongoing Potential Upsides Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy) Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019	Vaccines	11	*	20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen	PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S.	2019; 2H 2020
Rare Disease & Internal Medicine 14 * Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy) PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation) 2H 2019 15 * Tanezumab (OA & CLBP) Reviewing data and evaluating next steps ongoing Potential Upsides Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy) Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019	000	12	X	Domagrozumab (DMD)	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
Internal Medicine 15 * Tanezumab (OA & CLBP) Reviewing data and evaluating next steps ongoing Potential Upsides Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy) Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019	(-) (-)	13	*	Rivipansel (VOC of SCD)	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2019
Potential Upsides Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019	Rare Disease &	14	*	Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy)	PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation)	2H 2019
Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy) Pivotal Phase 3 study start 2H 2019	Internal Medicine	15	*	Tanezumab (OA & CLBP)	Reviewing data and evaluating next steps	ongoing
			Poten	tial Upsides		
Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer) Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate) 2019-2020		_		1 1 12/	•	2H 2019
				Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer)	Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate)	2019-2020

Management recommitted to its pipeline of "blockbuster" drugs in 2019.



Three of Which Had Already "Achieved Approval(s)" and Two of Which Had Received "Negative Pivotal Data"...

	J 5 I	or '	'Up to 15 in 5' Prog	grams	
Up to 15 Potenti			sters Approved by 2022 (Subje		
THERAPEUTIC ARE	4	_	PROGRAM	NEXT STEP	TIMING
	1		I/O Mono / Chemo Combos	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for Bavencio (1L gastric, 1L urothelial)	1H 2020
(25)	2	*	I/O-Targeted Agent Combos	PDUFA June 2019 for Bavencio + Inlyta (1L advanced RCC)	1H 2019
Con	3	\checkmark	Targeted Cancer Agents (collective)	• • •	1H 2019
Oncology	4		Ibrance Early-Stage Breast Cancer	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for PENELOPE and PALLAS	2H 2020
	5	\checkmark	Xtandi (M0 CRPC√ & M0/M1 HSPC)	File ARCHES data (mHSPC); EMBARK Phase 3 readout (nmHSPC)	2019; 2H 2020
SMA	6	*	JAK1 (Atopic Dermatitis)	Phase 3 monotherapy readouts	1H 2019
(S.)	7	*	JAK3 (Alopecia Areata / Vitiligo)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for alopecia areata	2H 2021
181	8	\checkmark	Xeljanz Lifecycle Mgt (PsA, UC, AS)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for ankylosing spondylitis	2H 2020
Ro	9	*	Clostridium Difficile	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2020
	10	X	Staphyloccoccus Aureus	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
Vaccines	11	*	20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen	PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S.	2019; 2H 2020
000	12	X	Domagrozumab (DMD)	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
(-)	13	*	Rivipansel (VOC of SCD)	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2019
Rare Disease &	14	*	Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy)	PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation)	2H 2019
Internal Medicine	15	*	Tanezumab (OA & CLBP)	Reviewing data and evaluating next steps	ongoing
	I	Poten	tial Upsides		
	_		Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy)	Pivotal Phase 3 study start	2H 2019
			Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer)	Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate)	2019-2020
		🗸 Achi	ieved Approval(s)	Negative Pivotal Data * Expedited Designation	

Pfizer had already made significant approval progress on three of 15 drugs.




... Leaving Management With 10 Potential Blockbusters It Explicitly Targeted

Un to 15 Detenti			Up to 15 in 5' Prog		
		оскри	sters Approved by 2022 (Subje		
THERAPEUTIC AREA	۱ <u> </u>		PROGRAM	NEXT STEP	TIMING
1	1		I/O Mono / Chemo Combos	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for Bavencio (1L gastric, 1L urothelial)	1H 2020
	2	*	I/O-Targeted Agent Combos	PDUFA June 2019 for Bavencio + Inlyta (1L advanced RCC)	1H 2019
	3	\checkmark	Targeted Cancer Agents (collective)	Potential EU approvals	1H 2019
Oncology 3	4		Ibrance Early-Stage Breast Cancer	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for PENELOPE and PALLAS	2H 2020
	5	\checkmark	Xtandi (M0 CRPC√ & M0/M1 HSPC)	File ARCHES data (mHSPC); EMBARK Phase 3 readout (nmHSPC)	2019; 2H 202
	6	*	JAK1 (Atopic Dermatitis)	Phase 3 monotherapy readouts	1H 2019
5	7	*	JAK3 (Alopecia Areata / Vitiligo)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for alopecia areata	2H 2021
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Vaccines 7	11	*	20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen	PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S.	2019; 2H 2020
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	_		Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy)	Pivotal Phase 3 study start	2H 2019
			Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer)	Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate)	2019-2020
		✓ Achi	eved Approval(s)	Negative Pivotal Data * Expedited Designation	

In summary, current management had ten opportunities to deliver blockbuster drugs.



1,2 While Bavencio Was Approved, Its Revenue Contribution Fell Short of "Blockbuster" And Was Ultimately Divested



Bavencio ultimately did not become a blockbuster drug and will not contribute to revenue moving forward.

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3 Pfizer's Early Breast Cancer Phase III Study For IBRANCE Ultimately Failed

Excerpt from Fierce Pharma
PHARMA
Pfizer's Ibrance kisses early breast
cancer hopes goodbye with 2nd
study failure
study failule
By Carly Helfand • Oct 9, 2020 11:35am
breast cancer CDK 4/6 Eli Lilly Ibrance

Unfortunately, Pfizer was unable to be successful with IBRANCE in early stage breast cancer.



4 While Cibinqo (JAK1) Was Approved, It's Expected To Fall Well Short of "Blockbuster" Status By 2030



Cibinqo received FDA approval though its sales will likely fall well below internal expectations.

Source: Public Company filings and Bloomberg. (1) Represents consensus estimates.

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5 Litfulo (JAK3) Is Similarly Expected to Fall Well Short of "Blockbuster" Status by 2030



Litfulo received FDA approval though its sales will likely fall well below internal expectations.

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6 To-Date, Pfizer's C. Difficile Vaccine Studies Have Failed to Achieve Its Primary Endpoints

Excerpt from Wall Street Research Report				
	C. Diff Vaccine Misses Primary Endpoint in Phase III Trial But Other Secondary			
	Endpoints Were Encouraging; Novel C. Diff Vaccines Currently In Phase I			
	In March 2017, Pfizer initiated the Phase III (CLOVER) trial to evaluate PF-06425090, a			
	vaccine under evaluation for the prevention of <i>C. difficile</i> infections. In March 2022,			
	Pfizer announced that the trial failed to meet its pre-specified primary endpoints of			
	preventing primary C. diff infection ≥ 14 days following completion of the third dose and			
	14 days following completion of the second dose. Vaccine efficacy was 31% following			
	the third dose and 28.6% following the second dose; overall vaccine efficacy for all C.			
	diff. cases recorded 14 days post dose 3 was 49% at 12 months, 47% at 24 months, and			
	31% at four years (the final analysis). Pfizer was encouraged by secondary endpoints			
	which showed a 0-11 vaccine: placebo split in medically attended C. diff infection, a median C. diff infection duration of 1 vs. 4 days, and a mean C. diff infection duration of			
	median C. diff infection duration of 1 vs. 4 days, and a mean C. diff infection duration of 3 vs. 16 days for vaccine vs. placebo. The vaccine was well tolerated with mild-moderate			
	local and systemic reactions with similar rates of overall AEs, SAEs, withdrawals, and			
	deaths in the vaccine vs. placebo groups. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, final analysis			
	was performed on 42 cases within four years rather than the planned 66 cases within			
	two years of primary vaccination after an FDA approved protocol amendment. While			
	PF-06425090 is still listed in Phase III in Pfizer's pipeline as of Q3:23, the company has			
	also initiated Phase I trials evaluating novel formulations of its C. Diff vaccine.			

Unfortunately, Pfizer has yet to have success with its C. Difficile vaccine.



7 Pfizer Has Had Continued Success With its PCV20 Vaccine...

Excerpt from Pfizer Press Release

U.S. FDA Approves PREVNAR 20®, Pfizer's 20-valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine for Infants and Children

Thursday, April 27, 2023 - 03:42pm

🛯 🗞 🖻 🛛

- PREVNAR 20 offers the broadest serotype coverage of any pediatric pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, helping to protect against all 20 serotypes contained in the vaccine
- PREVNAR 20 builds on PREVNAR 13[®] and includes seven additional serotypes shown to be associated with antibiotic resistance, heightened disease severity, invasive potential, and prevalence in pediatric pneumococcal cases.¹
- The vaccine further advances Pfizer's pediatric pneumococcal vaccine portfolio and builds on more than 20 years of Pfizer leadership, legacy and innovation in developing pneumococcal conjugate vaccines

NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Pfizer Inc. (NYSE: PFE) announced today that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved PREVNAR 20[®](20-valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine) for the prevention of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) caused by the 20 *Streptococcus pneumoniae* (pneumococcal) serotypes contained in the vaccine in infants and children six weeks through 17 years of age, and for the prevention of otitis media in infants six weeks through five years of age caused by the original seven serotypes contained in PREVNAR[®].

Prevnar continues to be a bright spot for Pfizer.



7 ... Though Now There Are Concerns About Threats to Pfizer's PCV20 From Potential New Vaccines

Excerpts From Wall Street Research Analysts

"VAX-31 APPEARS BEST-IN-CLASS & SHOULD LEAD THE EXPANDING ADULT + INFANT MARKET... VAX-31 met non-inferiority to PCV20 across the board, was superior on many difficult and highly-prevalent serotypes, and the data were more striking than for V116. The probability of even broader superiority in Phase III (starting in H1) is now much higher. The ~\$8B market could grow to over \$13B by 2027, and we believe VAX-31 should become the leader and generate significant strategic interest."

TD Cowen September 2024

"Based on our proprietary PCV market model (NOTE), considering the potentially evolving landscape including lowering universal age recommendation, "catch-up" and prime-booster vaccination, we continue to believe VAX-31, if successful, will take up the lion's share in a growing \sim \$10B+ future PCV market. With that, together with current \sim \$7.1B EV (\sim \$1.9B cash), we see meaningful upside potential(\sim 50%) following today's data."

Jefferies September 2024

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"VAX-31 has the potential to displace Prevnar 20 (and one could argue even MRK's Capvaxive (PCV21), though we generally think ACIP may prefer having some redundancy in the system)." Mizuho September 2024 "Prevnar-20 is the leading pneumococcal vaccine, but Merck's 21-valent Capvaxive for adults could be a headwind to growth; other 20+ valent vaccines for infants are in development at MRK, GSK, PCVX, and SNY." TD Conven October 2024

Pfizer must continue to innovate with Prevnar to fend off looming threats.

8 Pfizer's Rivipansel Failed to Achieve Primary and Secondary Endpoints

Excerpt from Pfizer Press Release

Pfizer Announces Phase 3 Top-Line Results for Rivipansel in Patients with Sickle Cell Disease Experiencing a Vaso-Occlusive Crisis

Friday, August 02, 2019 - 02:49pm

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Pfizer Inc. (NYSE:PFE) announced today that the Phase 3 **R**ivipansel (GMI-1070): **E**valuating Safety, **E**fficacy and **T**ime to Discharge (RESET) pivotal study **did not meet its primary or key** secondary efficacy endpoints. The objective of the trial was to evaluate the efficacy and safety of rivipansel in patients aged six and older with sickle cell disease (SCD) who were hospitalized for a vaso-occlusive crisis (VOC) and required treatment with intravenous (IV) opioids. The primary endpoint was time to readiness-for-discharge and the key secondary efficacy endpoints were time-to-discharge, cumulative IV opioid consumption, and time to discontinuation of IV opioids.

Unfortunately, Rivipansel was not successful in its Phase 3 study.



9 Pfizer's Tafamidis Was Approved for ATTR-CM and Has Proven to Be a Blockbuster

Excerpt from Pfizer Press Release

Tafamidis Phase 3 Transthyretin Amyloid Cardiomyopathy (ATTR-ACT) Study Results Presented as Late-Breaking Data at the ESC Congress 2018

Monday, August 27, 2018 - 01:21am

P & E 🛛

ATTR-ACT Showed that Tafamidis Significantly Reduced the Combination of All-cause Mortality and Cardiovascular-related Hospitalizations Data Showed a 30% Reduction in the Risk of Mortality and 32% Reduction in the Rate of Cardiovascular-related Hospitalizations with Tafamidis in People with Transthyretin Amyloid Cardiomyopathy versus Placebo

Tafamidis was successful though Phase 3 readout had already occurred prior to 2019.

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Unfortunately, Pfizer was also unsuccessful in developing Tanezumab.

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Again, Management Defined Success as Constant and Breakthrough Innovation...

Excerpt From 2019 Goldman Sachs Conference (January 3, 2019)



"But as you think about what markers you want to set for the company in the near term, so maybe in 12 months' time, kind of on a 3-year view or a 5-year view, how do you deem success over the short term?:"

"I think -- well, it's inevitable that for every CEO, the success is measured through -- with total shareholder return, how much your stock was appreciated and how much dividend were you able to pass to the shareholders. But let's not forget that this is only a surrogate point, a very good one because the market really knows how to value your operational value creation. But it is a surrogate point, where fundamental it is how much you can stay true to your purpose. And the purpose of the pharma company is to bring breakthrough products that change patients' lives. So the operational measurement of success will be our ability to have a constant flow of breakthrough innovation that significantly changes the current standards of care, and that's for the long term. So a way to measure it, for us, it is we have put out there a list of 15 potential blockbusters that could come by the year -- in 5 years, so it is by 2022 when we put it out in '18. And I think my focus would be to make sure that we deliver more than our fair risk adjustment of this number, and that will be success."



Albert Bourla *Pfizer Chair and CEO*

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Pfizer management committed to "constant flow" of innovation – as highlighted by 15 potential blockbusters.

Source: Public company transcripts. Quotes are bolded and underlined for emphasis.

... We Believe Management Has Failed to Deliver On This Commitment

001010101011110	al Blo	ockbu	sters Approved by 2022 (Subje	ct to Attrition)	
THERAPEUTIC AREA		_	PROGRAM	NEXT STEP	TIMING
	1		I/O Mono / Chemo Combos	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for Bavencio (1L gastric, 1L urothelial)	1H 2020
	2	*	I/O-Targeted Agent Combos	PDUFA June 2019 for Bavencio + Inlyta (1L advanced RCC)	1H 2019
	3	\checkmark	Targeted Cancer Agents (collective)	Potential EU approvals	1H 2019
Oncology 3	4		Ibrance Early-Stage Breast Cancer	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for PENELOPE and PALLAS	2H 2020
	5	\checkmark	Xtandi (M0 CRPC√ & M0/M1 HSPC)	File ARCHES data (mHSPC); EMBARK Phase 3 readout (nmHSPC)	2019; 2H 202
(M) 4	6	*	JAK1 (Atopic Dermatitis)	Phase 3 monotherapy readouts	1H 2019
5	7	*	JAK3 (Alopecia Areata / Vitiligo)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for alopecia areata	2H 2021
1&1	8	\checkmark	Xeljanz Lifecycle Mgt (PsA, UC, AS)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for ankylosing spondylitis	2H 2020
6	9	*	Clostridium Difficile	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2020
	10	X	Staphyloccoccus Aureus	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
Vaccines 7	11	*	20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen	PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S.	2019; 2H 202
00	12	X	Domagrozumab (DMD)	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
6 6-8	13	*	Rivipansel (VOC of SCD)	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2019
Rare Disease	14	*	Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy)	PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation)	2H 2019
Internal Medical	15	*	Tanezumab (OA & CLBP)	Reviewing data and evaluating next steps	ongoing
	F	Potent	ial Upsides		
	_		Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy)	Pivotal Phase 3 study start	2H 2019
			Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer)	Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate)	2019-2020

We do not believe Pfizer achieved "constant" and "breakthrough" innovations.



At the Beginning of 2023, the Company Also Set a \$10 Billion Sales Target for GLP-1s

Excerpts from Company Transcripts

"Now we will see how things will evolve. But that's one clearly. GLP-1, clearly, everybody is excited about that. I believe that it is something that could -- we said that we think it could be \$10 billion product for us in a market that could be \$90 billion. So it's not part of this calculation, but it is a major upside if we get it right. Again, we think that we'll be very few players that will play in the oral GLP-1, us and Lilly. <u>Clearly, we are going to be one of them</u>. We think the data should show which one has a better profile. We believe and we hope that we will have. But no matter what, it's going to be so big a market that it's going to be a very big product for both of us, I think." Albert Bourla (PFE CEO) January 9, 2023

"We're happy to speak about our exciting GLP-1 programs. We have 2 programs, right, danuglipron and then PF-1532, which we now refer to as lotiglipron. So we believe that it's going to be a \$90 billion market opportunity set in 10 years, so a little bit beyond 2030 across type 2 diabetes and obesity.


We believe that oral GLP-1s will take 30% of this opportunity in a Pfizer oral GLP-1, either danuglipron or lotiglipron could garner about 1/3 of that oral segment. So the math calculation here is 30% share of \$90 billion and then 1/3 of that \$27 billion, that gets you to about \$9 billion in the U.S. And internationally, today, 90% of sales -- or globally, today, 90% of sales of GLP-1s occur in the U.S. given price realization and market access. So we expect about 10% for international, assuming nothing changes in that dynamic. And that's how we get to our \$10 billion global opportunity for Pfizer oral GLP-1."

Andy Schmeltz (PFE Global President of Oncology) February 16, 2023

The Company told investors GLP-1s were a \$10 billion sales opportunity.



As a Result, Wall Street Research Analysts Gave Management Some Risk-Adjusted Credit For GLP-1s



Wall Street research analysts risk-adjusted management's \$10 billion sales target.

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However, the Company's GLP-1 Assets Have Not Been Successful To Date...

The Company discontinued its Phase 2b Danuglipron (twice a day formulation) after tolerability issues.

"We expect PFE to trade lower today following disclosure of topline results from the phase 2b obesity study of the company's twice daily oral GLP-1 receptor agonist, danuglipron. Despite the study meeting its primary endpoint of body weight change from baseline vs placebo, <u>we view the results as markedly negative for the</u> <u>program, with PFE discontinuing further development of the twice daily formulation</u>."

> Goldman Sachs December 1, 2023

The Company is continuing to invest behind a once a day formulation, but analysts are skeptical.

"This morning, PFE announced that it is advancing the development of its QD formulation of danuglipron (oral GLP-1) based on recent PK data, and we wanted to provide our thoughts. Overall, while we are not surprised that PFE is moving forward with this program, <u>we remain skeptical on the asset with questions remaining on</u> <u>the tolerability profile</u>... Net-net, we are not surprised by today's news but <u>continue to see a limited role for the asset absent more clarity on the tolerability profile</u> <u>of the new formulation and based on LLY's significant time-to-mkt advantage for orforglipron</u> (ph3 data expected in mid-2025)."


> J.P. Morgan July 11, 2024

> > STARBOARD VALUE


115

The Company appears to have missed the mark on GLP-1s.

... Resulting In a Substantial Decline In Expected Sales From Danuglipron



Other Peers, However, Have Been Able to Introduce Successful GLP-1 Products



Peers have been successful at developing and commercializing GLP-1s whereas Pfizer has not.

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Source: Bloomberg. (1) Represents consensus estimates. (2) LLY represents the total of Mounjaro and Zepbound. NVO represents the total of Ozempic and Wegovy. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included. **B.** Lack of Expected Future Innovation

Looking Forward, Wall Street Research Analysts Are Not Expecting Significant Revenue Growth From Pfizer

Wall Street research analysts expect Pfizer's revenue to decline by 3% (9% increase excluding COVID) from 2023 to 2030.



Wall Street research analysts expect Pfizer's revenue to decline through 2030.

Source: Bloomberg.

Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



Even Excluding Pfizer's Large Patent Expirations, the Company Is Still Expected to Underperform on Growth

Accounting for sizable patent expirations further highlights Pfizer's lagging gross revenue growth relative to peers.




We believe the Company should seek to improve R&D and innovation to improve growth prospects.

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Source: Visible Alpha, Bloomberg, and Wall Street research. (1) Based on Starboard's research and estimates. Represents products with patent expirations or products that are expected to significantly decline per consensus estimates. Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.

Critically, the Company's Lower Revenue Growth Reflects Lower Return on R&D Spend



The Company is expected to generate lower returns on R&D already spent.

Source: Public company filings and Bloomberg. (1) Cumulative R&D spend from 2019 to 2023. Includes IPR&D not captured by M&A. (2) Cumulative M&A spend from 2019 to 2023. (3) Cumulative R&D estimated COVID-related R&D of \$4 billion. Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included. STARBOARDVALUE


C. Capital Allocation

Pfizer Pursued Significant Inorganic Investments Over the Last Five Years

The Company used its COVID-19 cash benefit to make multiple large acquisitions.

Select PFE Transactions (\$bn)

The Company invested nearly \$70 Billion in M&A since the pandemic




The Company used more than its COVID cash benefit on large M&A transactions.

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Source: Public company filings.

The Company Expects Its Acquisitions Since 2022 to Generate >\$20.5 Billion in Sales by 2030




Pfizer management expects these transactions to contribute >\$20.5 billion in revenue by 2030.

Source: Public company presentation.



Pfizer Appears to Have Overpaid For Its Post 2022 Acquisitions Based On the Company's Own Sales Targets



The Company's EV / Sales multiple for its M&A is higher than the industry median for the last 10 years.




Source: Wall Street research and public company presentation. (1) Revenue multiple based upon 2030 sales. (2) Entire Biopharma Industry >\$1bn in TEV.

Wall Street Research Analysts Expect Sales of Pfizer's Deals to Fall Short By \$7 Billion

Wall Street research analysts expect the contributions from the Company's announced M&A ambitions to fall well short.

2030 Expected Sales From M&A: Management Estimates vs. Sellside Consensus (\$bn)




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Wall Street research analysts expect the Company's announced M&A to underdeliver.

Pfizer Appears to Have Significantly Overpaid Based Upon Wall Street's Lower Sales Expectations




Accounting for lower sales expectations highlights the lofty multiples paid by Pfizer.

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Source: Wall Street research and public company presentation. (1) Revenue multiple based upon 2030 sales. (2) Entire Biopharma Industry >\$1bn in TEV.

Lower Sales Expectations at Market Multiples Suggest Significant Value Was Lost Through M&A




We believe the Company likely lost more than \$20 billion in value from M&A.

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In 2022, the Company Acquired Global Blood Therapeutics For Over \$5 Billion...

In 2022, the Company acquired Global Blood Therapeutics for \$5.4 billion with a focus on sickle-cell disease.



Pfizer expected GBT's product portfolio to generate worldwide peak sales of >\$3 billion.



... But Recently the Company Removed GBT's Main Drug From the Market Following Adverse Effects

In September 2024, Pfizer suddenly voluntarily withdrew GBT's lead sickle cell disease treatment from the market.

Excerpt From Pfizer Press Release

Pfizer Voluntarily Withdraws All Lots of Sickle Cell Disease Treatment OXBRYTA® (voxelotor) From Worldwide Markets

09/25/2024

NEW YORK--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Pfizer Inc. (NYSE: PFE) announced today that it is voluntarily withdrawing all lots of OXBRYTA[®] (voxelotor) for the treatment of sickle cell disease (SCD) at this time, in all markets where it is approved. Pfizer is also discontinuing all active voxelotor clinical trials and expanded access programs worldwide.

Pfizer's decision is based on the totality of clinical data that now indicates the overall benefit of OXBRYTA no longer outweighs the risk in the approved sickle cell patient population. The data suggest an imbalance in vaso-occlusive crises and fatal events which require further assessment. Pfizer has notified regulatory authorities about these findings and its decision to voluntarily withdraw OXBRYTA from the market and discontinue distribution and clinical studies while further reviewing the available data and investigating the findings.

"The safety and well-being of patients is of the utmost importance to Pfizer, and we believe this action is in the best interest of patients," said Aida Habtezion, Chief Medical Officer and Head of Worldwide Medical and Safety at Pfizer. "Our primary concern is for patients who suffer from SCD, which remains a very serious and difficult-to-treat disease with limited treatment options. We advise patients to contact their physicians to discuss alternative treatment while we continue to investigate the findings from our review of the data."

Pfizer decided that OXBRYTA's benefits no longer outweighed its risks and pulled the product from the market.



Pfizer's Failed GBT Acquisition Shocked the Industry and Raised Serious Questions About Its BD Capabilities

Select Quotes from Wall Street Research Analysts

"Oxbryta pulled from market; \$5.4bn GBT deal <u>latest example of challenged BD track record</u>. Pfizer announced voluntary withdrawal of sickle-cell therapy Oxbryta globally today, citing an updated view that the totality of data suggests a more negative risk-benefit profile. This likely implies an imbalance in VOCs and/or fatal events to warrant the quick action. The decision comes just shy of the two-year mark from Pfizer's \$5.4bn acquisition of Global Blood Therapeutics (GBT) to obtain Oxbryta and a follow-on sickle cell pipeline. While Pfizer reaffirmed '24 guidance and the NPV impact is minimal (see consensus numbers below) this will again raise questions on Pfizer's BD effort - feeding into old criticism around Pfizer's ability to pick winners through BD."

Barclays – Sept 25, 2024

<u>"When you cover biotech and pharma - it's hard to find a headline that's truly jarring, but news that PFE is recalling Oxbryta/discontinuing</u> all active trials after seeing a death/ VOC imbalance in clinical trials & lack of overall risk-benefit fits the bill."

Jefferies - Sept 26, 2024


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Wall Street analysts were shocked by Pfizer's recall of OXBRYTA.

D. Forecasting and Budgeting Issues

The Company Has a Poor Track Record of Achieving Quarterly Consensus Expectations Since 2019




The Company has a poor record of achieving consensus expectations.

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Notably, the Company's Peers Are Meaningfully More Consistent Than Pfizer At Achieving Consensus Sales



Pfizer achieves consensus sales expectations less consistently than its peers.

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Source: Bloomberg.

Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.

We Believe COVID Represents the Clearest Example of the Company Improperly Forecasting Its Business

COVID Assumptions vs. Results						
	Management's Expectations	Actual Results	Achieved?			
2023 COVID Revenue	\$21.5 billion	\$12.5 billion	X			
Long-Term COVID Revenue Trajectory	Growth after 2023 trough	2024 guidance forecasting another \$4 billion decline	X			


The Company misjudged the durability of COVID sales.



Pfizer Guided to 2023 COVID Sales of \$21.5 Billion Based On Inventory Absorption and Normalized Utilization

While management recognized 2022 COVID-19 sales resulted in an inventory build-up, it still assumed a significant level of COVID sales in 2023 with increases thereafter.

Pfizer's COVID Vaccine and Paxlovid Sales (2021 – 2023) (\$mm)




Management guided to \$21.5 billion in COVID-19 sales for 2023.

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Importantly, Management Expected 2023 COVID Sales to be the Trough With <u>Sustained Growth Thereafter</u>




Despite a significant reduction in COVID-19 sales for 2023, management expected growth to resume in 2024.

Source: Public company presentation. Emphasis added in red.

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Unfortunately, the Company Ultimately Missed Its 2023 COVID Sales Guidance By a Wide Margin...

The Company ultimately fell significantly short of its expected 2023 COVID-19 sales by \$9 billion.




Actual 2023 COVID-19 sales were \$9 billion less than management expected.

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... And Now Expects 2024 COVID Sales to Decline Instead of Its Initial Sustained Growth Assumption

While management assumed COVID-19 sales would increase after 2023's inventory absorption, its guidance now assumes even further reductions into 2024.




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Source: Public company filings.

Lower-Than-Expected 2024 COVID Guidance Resulted In a Substantial 2024 Earnings Guidance Miss



FY24 Adj. EPS Consensus (Dec-23)

FY24 Adj. Initial EPS Guidance (Dec-23)

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Poor COVID expectations and projections led to a significant earnings guidance miss.

Source: Public company filings.

Notably, the Magnitude of the Company's Guidance Miss Resulted In a Blow to Management's Credibility

Select Commentary From Wall Street Research Analysts

"Investors in PFE have been battered twice in the last 2 weeks - the first came with danuglipron's failure (oral GLP1), the second with the new guidance. No doubt there was an element of capitulation... In other words, despite a year of major underperformance, it's hard to say PFE's a "buy." Some credibility has been lost, and the near-term catalyst path is not a strong one."

Wolfe December 14, 2023

"Given the high number of questions we have received on EPS and margin dynamics and the implications for 2025 results, <u>we do not see today's update as a clearing</u> event. Today's update essentially should provide a floor on COVID estimates and EPS, in our view. <u>However, there remains a significant amount of uncertainty on what</u> is driving 2024 margins & EPS so low (i.e. whether this is due to depressed COVID guidance or there is an issue with the core business margins, or a mix of both). And based on our conversations, we expect that investors will have a hard time stepping into the story until they gain further clarity."

> JP Morgan December 13, 2023

"But we don't have much conviction in the outlook, making it tough to pound the table even from these levels... <u>Level Of Confidence In Management - Our</u> <u>confidence is not the highest for several reasons.</u> PFE provided guidance on many parameters but in retrospect much of it is proving to have been too optimistic, is no longer supported, and resulted in two reductions in guidance in 2023. We were not fans of the Seagen acquisition from the start, given that each of the key assets has associated questions, making the outlook less than clear, particularly given the price paid.

TD Cowen January 4, 2024

The massive earnings guidance miss significantly damaged management's credibility.



Conclusion

We Agree with Management – TSR and Innovation Are the Defining Characteristics of Success for a Pharma Company

Excerpt From 2019 Goldman Sachs Conference (January 3, 2019)



"But as you think about what markers you want to set for the company in the near term, so maybe in 12 months' time, kind of on a 3-year view or a 5-year view, how do you deem success over the short term?:"

"I think -- well, it's inevitable that for every CEO, the success is measured through -- with total shareholder return, how much your stock was appreciated and how much dividend were you able to pass to the shareholders. But let's not forget that this is only a surrogate point, a very good one because the market really knows how to value your operational value creation. But it is a surrogate point, where fundamental it is how much you can stay true to your purpose. And the purpose of the pharma company is to bring breakthrough products that change patients' lives. So the operational measurement of success will be our ability to have a constant flow of breakthrough innovation that significantly changes the current standards of care, and that's for the long term. So a way to measure it, for us, it is we have put out there a list of 15 potential blockbusters that could come by the year -- in 5 years, so it is by 2022 when we put it out in '18. And I think my focus would be to make sure that we deliver more than our fair risk adjustment of this number, and that will be success."



Albert Bourla *Pfizer Chair and CEO*

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Pfizer management committed to "constant flow" of innovation – as highlighted by 15 potential blockbusters.

Source: Public company transcripts. Quotes are bolded and underlined for emphasis.

The Company's TSR Since 2019 Has Been Poor



Pfizer has underperformed over the last five years.

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The Company Also Failed to Achieve Constant and Breakthrough Innovation

Un to 15 Dotont			Up to 15 in 5' Prog sters Approved by 2022 (Subje		
		скри			
THERAPEUTIC ARE	4		PROGRAM	NEXT STEP	TIMING
1	1		I/O Mono / Chemo Combos	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for Bavencio (1L gastric, 1L urothelial)	1H 2020
	2	*	I/O-Targeted Agent Combos	PDUFA June 2019 for Bavencio + Inlyta (1L advanced RCC)	1H 2019
	3	\checkmark	Targeted Cancer Agents (collective)	Potential EU approvals	1H 2019
Oncology 3	4		Ibrance Early-Stage Breast Cancer	Phase 3 pivotal readouts for PENELOPE and PALLAS	2H 2020
	5	\checkmark	Xtandi (M0 CRPC√ & M0/M1 HSPC)	File ARCHES data (mHSPC); EMBARK Phase 3 readout (nmHSPC)	2019; 2H 2020
(M) 4	6	*	JAK1 (Atopic Dermatitis)	Phase 3 monotherapy readouts	1H 2019
5	7	*	JAK3 (Alopecia Areata / Vitiligo)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for alopecia areata	2H 2021
181	8	\checkmark	Xeljanz Lifecycle Mgt (PsA, UC, AS)	Phase 3 pivotal readout for ankylosing spondylitis	2H 2020
6	9	*	Clostridium Difficile	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2020
	10	X	Staphyloccoccus Aureus	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
Vaccines 7	11	*	20v Pneumococcal Next-Gen	PCV20 Infant POC readout; potential PCV20 Adult filing in the U.S.	2019; 2H 2020
00	12	X	Domagrozumab (DMD)	Discontinued (futility)	N/A
	13	*	Rivipansel (VOC of SCD)	Phase 3 pivotal readout	2H 2019
Rare Disease 9	14	*	Tafamidis (aTTR cardiomyopathy)	PDUFA July 2019/(November 2019 for free acid formulation)	2H 2019
Internal Medic	15	*	Tanezumab (OA & CLBP)	Reviewing data and evaluating next steps	ongoing
		Potent	tial Upsides		
	_		Hemophilia B (FIX Gene Therapy)	Pivotal Phase 3 study start	2H 2019
			Biosimilars Bundle (RA & Cancer)	Up to four potential approvals (potential blockbuster in aggregate)	2019-2020
		√ Achi	eved Approval(s)	Negative Pivotal Data * Expedited Designation	

We do not believe Pfizer achieved "constant" and "breakthrough" innovations.



Capital Allocation Is Extremely Important For Large Pharma Companies


For large pharma companies, like many other companies, it is critical to have the discipline to achieve the right return on investment.

Management needs to be held accountable for capital allocation.

Capital allocation is a key value driver for large pharma.

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
We Believe the Root Cause of Pfizer's Issues Are Its Low Expected Return on Organic and Inorganic R&D Investments



The Company is expected to generate worst-in-class returns on R&D and M&A.

Source: Public company filings and Bloomberg. (1) Cumulative R&D spend from 2019 to 2023. Includes IPR&D not captured by M&A. (2) Cumulative M&A spend from 2019 to 2023. (3) Cumulative R&D excludes estimated COVID-related R&D of \$4 billion. Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included. STARBOARDVALUE


The Board Needs to Be Laser Focused On Tracking Pfizer's Return on R&D Investments



This is not acceptable.

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Adjusting For LOEs, Pfizer Is Currently Expected to Grow by \$19 Billion of Revenue From 2023 to 2030



This is not acceptable.

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
If the Company Is Going to Continue Its R&D Investment Rate, It Needs to Generate Considerably More Revenue

Incremental Revenue Growth Required (Ex. COVID)						
Cumulative R&D and M&A Investments (2019 – 2023)	\$128 billion					
(x) Peer Median Rev. Return on R&D + M&A Investments	38%					
= Required Gross Revenue Growth	\$48 billion					
(-) Consensus Gross Revenue Growth	(\$19 billion)					
= Incremental Gross Revenue Growth Required	\$29 billion					

The Company needs to achieve higher revenue growth based on its R&D and M&A investments.

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Specifically, the Company Would Have to Generate \$79 Billion in 2030 Revenue to Achieve Peer Median Revenue Returns



The Company would have to generate \$79 billion in 2030 revenue.

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The Board Needs to Hold Management Accountable For Achieving Sufficient Revenue Returns on R&D and M&A

- We agree with management: "the operational measurement of success will be [Pfizer's] ability to have a constant flow of breakthrough innovation"
- Underlying Pfizer's ability to produce consistent innovation is its ability to generate attractive revenue returns on its R&D and M&A investments
- Management is allocating a substantial amount of shareholder capital
- To-date, the Company has not achieved sufficient revenue returns on R&D and M&A
 - The Company is expected to generate revenue returns of just 15% compared to the peer median of 38%
 - Pfizer ranks worst-in-class among its peer group on expected gross revenue growth from 2023 to 2030 based on its cumulative R&D and M&A from 2019 to 2023
 - Capital allocation and M&A is critically important to pharma companies Pfizer has been worst-in-class
- The Board is responsible for holding management accountable on improving its expected revenue return to at least 38%



The Board needs to hold management accountable for improving performance.



The Board Needs to Hold Management Accountable to Achieve the Appropriate Returns on Capital

We believe it is unlikely that Pfizer will be able to achieve \$79 billion in revenue by 2030 thereby making Pfizer's return on R&D and M&A insufficient.

We believe the Board needs to actively hold management accountable for earning appropriate returns on R&D and M&A moving forward.


Pfizer deserves to be best in class.

The Board needs to hold management accountable for capital allocation.



We Believe There Is Substantial Upside at Pfizer

We believe concerns regarding the Company's innovation track record, pipeline, capital allocation, and lost credibility has resulted in a depressed valuation multiple.



We are excited to own the business at current valuation multiples as we believe there is substantial upside.

Source: Bloomberg and CapIQ.

Starboard has identified BMY, AZN, JNJ, NOVN, ROG, MRK, SAN, GILD, ABBV, AMGN, LLY, NVO, and GSK as the relevant peer set for comparing PFE. Starboard believes these provide appropriate peer comparisons. This presentation is a determination that is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. As the full universe of potential peers is not listed here, the comparisons made herein may differ materially if other firms had been included.



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